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Abstract The self is one the most important concepts in social cognition and plays
a crucial role in determining questions such as which social groups we view our-
selves as belonging to and how we relate to others. In the past decade, the self has
also become an important topic within cognitive neuroscience with an explosion in
the number of studies seeking to understand how different aspects of the self are
represented within the brain. In this paper, we first outline the recent research on the
neurocognitive basis of the self and highlight a key distinction between two forms of
self-representation. The first is the ‘‘bodily’’ self, which is thought to be the basis of
subjective experience and is grounded in the processing of sensorimotor signals.
The second is the ‘‘conceptual’’ self, which develops through our interactions of
other and is formed of a rich network of associative and semantic information. We
then investigate how both the bodily and conceptual self are related to social
cognition with an emphasis on how self-representations are involved in the pro-
cessing and creation of prejudice. We then highlight new research demonstrating
that the bodily and conceptual self are both malleable and that this malleability can
be harnessed in order to achieve a reduction in social prejudice. In particular, we
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can lead to changes in attitudes at the conceptual level. We will highlight a series of
studies demonstrating that social attitudes towards various social out-groups (e.g.
racial groups) can lead to a reduction in prejudice towards that group. Finally, we
seek to place these findings in a broader social context by considering how inno-
vations in virtual reality technology can allow experiences of taking on another’s
identity are likely to become both more commonplace and more convincing in the
future and the various opportunities and risks associated with using such technology
to reduce prejudice.
Keywords Self  Body representation  Prejudice  Virtual reality  Social
cognition
Introduction
The self is one the most important concepts in social cognition and plays a crucial
role in determining which social groups we view ourselves as belonging to and how
we relate to others. In the past decade, the self has also become an important topic
within cognitive neuroscience, with an explosion in the number of studies seeking to
understand how different aspects of the self are represented within the brain. In this
paper, we first outline the recent research on the neurocognitive basis of the self and
highlight a key distinction between bodily and conceptual forms of self-represen-
tation. We then move on to discuss the social nature of the self and how both bodily
and conceptual forms of selfhood are closely tied to how we relate to others, with an
emphasis on how such relations are affected by social prejudice. Finally, we
highlight exciting recent research demonstrating the plasticity of self-representation
and examine how altering self-perception may provide novel techniques that can
increase empathy and decrease prejudice towards other social groups.
The Self: Bodily and Conceptual
The concept of the self has a long history in philosophy and the sciences, and our
attempts to characterise it have led theorists to distinguish between many different
forms of self. However, one clear distinction that emerges when reviewing the
literature on the self is that between the ‘‘bodily’’ self and the ‘‘conceptual’’ self.
The bodily self is thought to be the basis of subjective experience and is grounded in
the brain’s sensorimotor processing of the internal and external states of the body. In
contrast, the conceptual self is formed of a rich network of associative and semantic
information and develops through our interactions with others.
The distinction between these two important conceptions of selfhood can be
found in thinkers across academic disciplines and traditions. Zahavi (2005)
addresses this issue from the perspective of the phenomenological tradition and
draws on the analyses made by Husserl (1982), Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Sartre
(1956) to argue for the existence of both a phenomenal form of selfhood, which is
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considered to be an essential component of all subjective experience and to be
strongly linked to our experience of our bodies, and a conceptual form of selfhood,
which is greatly influenced by our interactions with others. A similar division of the
self has also been put forward in analytic philosophy by Bermúdez (1998) and
Strawson (1999) who both distinguish between forms of selfhood which require
conceptual and linguistic mastery of the first person pronoun and a more basic non-
conceptual self-consciousness, again assumed to rely primarily on sensorimotor
signal from the body.
In the psychological sciences, James (2014) distinguished between the two senses
of self, the ‘‘me self’’ which is the self experienced as object and can further be
divided into material, social and spiritual aspects, and the ‘‘I self’’ or pure Ego,
which is more fundamental and comprises the essence of lived subjective
experience. In a similar manner, Neisser (1991) distinguishes between an ecological
self which is developmentally primary and more advanced forms of selfhood such
as possession of an extended self or a self-concept which require the ability to reflect
on one’s experiences over long time periods and to be able to identify one’s self as
part of a larger social group, respectively. Finally based on empirical findings,
neuroscience researchers like Damasio (1999) and Edelman (2004) have distin-
guished between a continuously present form of self-awareness, based on the
integration of diverse sensory and motor processes (which Damasio terms the ‘‘core
self’’ and Edelman terms ‘‘primary consciousness’’) and a higher-level, temporally
extended sense of self which plays a key role in social interaction and in our sense
of personal identity. While the multifaceted nature of the concept of self means that
any attempt at a binary classification will necessarily be crude and neglect some
important nuances, for our current purposes we feel that the separation between
bodily and conceptual selfhood captures an important conceptual distinction. In
what follows, we will separately review current research regarding the theoretical
and neural basis of these two forms of selfhood before moving on to discuss how
both forms of the self can be linked to processes involved in social cognition.
Bodily Self
Of these two forms of self, the bodily self is the more fundamental in both
developmental and experiential terms. The bodily self is considered to arise from
the brain’s integration of multiple signals from different sensory modalities into one
coherent multimodal percept (De Vignemont, 2014; Hurley, 1998; Legrand, 2006).
This conception of the bodily self as the nexus of action and perception has also
been put forward within the cognitive sciences. Neisser’s (1991) account of the
ecological self, which draws heavily on Gibson’s (1979) theory of the importance of
motor affordances in perception, views the ecological self as being specified largely
by objective information which allows for the perception of both the location of the
body and how it is interacting with the environment. Neisser considers this
information to be largely dependent on knowledge of the body’s movements and
their relationship to vision. In addition to Neisser’s focus on the interaction of action
and perception, other researchers have emphasised the importance of internal bodily
signals (or ‘‘interoception’’) in generating self-relevant bodily information (Craig,
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2003; Damasio, 1999; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011). These interoceptive senses
include: proprioception or the movements of the musculoskeletal system (Fridland,
2011); the detection of the orientation of the body in space through the vestibular
system (Pfeiffer et al., 2013); the neural and chemical signals indicating the state of
one’s cardiac, respiratory and digestive systems (Craig, 2003); and sensory signals
for pain, itch, temperature and pleasant touch on the skin (McGlone & Reilly, 2010).
The sense of the bodily self is thought to arise when these sensory signals from
within the body are then integrated with information from the external senses,
primarily vision, to create a multisensory representation of the current state of the
body (Seth et al., 2011).
For much of the history of cognitive science, there was no known methodology
that allowed for the manipulation of people’s experience of the bodily self.
Although it was known that some neurological conditions could lead to
somatoparaphrenia, the loss of a feeling of ownership over one’s limbs (see Vallar
& Ronchi, 2009 for a review) examining this sense of body ownership in healthy
participants seemed impossible due the difficulty in separating participants from
what William James memorably described as ‘‘the feeling of the same old body
always there’’ (James, 2014, p. 134). However, in the past decade, researchers have
been able to carry out a large amount of research into body ownership thanks to a
technique published by Botvinick and Cohen (1998). There, they showed that it is
possible to induce a feeling of body ownership over an artificial hand by combining
the visual stimulation of the prosthetic rubber hand with synchronous tactile
stimulation of the participant’s own hand. The resultant feeling of ownership over
the rubber hand has led to this paradigm being known as the ‘‘rubber hand illusion’’
(RHI). This effect demonstrates that the experience of one’s body as one’s own
depends upon the brain’s ability to compare and integrate signals from different
senses in a probabilistic manner (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Limanowski &
Blankenburg, 2013). In the case of the RHI, the brain detects the synchrony
between the felt touch on the real hand and the seen touch on the rubber hand and
infers from this matching that the felt touch must originate from the observed hand
leading to the feeling of ownership over that hand.
Since the discovery of the RHI, researchers have demonstrated that the
integration of other body-related senses can also produce an illusory body
ownership. These include: visual-motor synchrony, in which participants observe
a hand moving in synch with one’s own (Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore,
2009; Riemer, Kleinböhl, Hölzl, & Trojan, 2013; Walsh, Moseley, Taylor, &
Gandevia, 2011); tactile-motor synchrony in which touching a fake hand while
one’s own hand is touched leads to the perception that the participant is touching
their own other hand (Lopez, Bieri, Preuss, & Mast, 2012; White, Davies, & Davies,
2011); the ‘‘rubber voice illusion’’ (Zheng, Macdonald, Munhall, & Johnsrude,
2011) in which hearing a stranger speaking while saying the same words one’s self
led participants to experience the others voice as a distorted version of their own;
between synchronous vision and pain stimulation (Capelari, Uribe, & Brasil-Neto,
2009); and by synchronising the rhythm of visual flashes on the fake hand to the
rhythm of participants’ heartbeat. These last two are particularly important, as they
involve the integration of an interoceptive signal (pain, or implicit awareness of the
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heartbeat) with an exteroceptive signal (vision). This lends support to models of
self-awareness which make a link between representations of the internal state of the
body and the bodily self (Craig, 2003; Damasio, 1999; Seth et al., 2011).
Further research has now extended the scope of body ownership, showing that
synchronous visual-tactile stimulation can also generate illusions of ownership over
other body parts in addition to the hand. For example, synchronous visual-tactile
stimulation between one’s own face and that of another can lead to an illusion of
ownership over the other’s face, as well as intriguing changes in the perceived
similarity of that face to one’s own (Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010;
Tsakiris, 2008). Furthermore, body ownership illusions are no longer restricted to
individual body parts; a ‘‘full-body illusion’’ has been developed, in which
participants feel that they are embodied in a different spatial location to that of their
own body (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007) and
even that they have swapped bodies with another person (Petkova & Ehrsson,
2008). These full-body illusions can also be generated by virtual reality, via visual-
motor synchrony leading to embodiment of an avatar (Slater, Perez-Marcos,
Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009).
By combining these methodologies with neuroimaging techniques, it has been
possible for cognitive neuroscientists to identify the brain areas that are integral for
generating the sense of body ownership and which may be fundamental for the
representation of the bodily self. These studies have revealed a network of uni- and
multisensory brain regions that appear to play a role in the experience of body
ownership. Some of these areas appear to reflect the specific properties of the body
part being stimulated, for example, experiencing synchronous stimulation on the
face leads to activation in face specific regions of the inferior occipital gyrus (Apps,
Tajadura-Jiménez, Sereno, Blanke, & Tsakiris, 2015), while stimulation of the hand
or whole body leads to activation in a visual region that is sensitive to non-face body
parts (Ionta et al., 2011; Limanowski, Lutti, & Blankenburg, 2014). However,
multisensory regions have also been identified which show sensitivity to the
manipulation of body ownership, including the temporal–parietal junction (TPJ)
(Ionta et al., 2011; Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008), the dorsoanterior insula
(Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Limanowski et al., 2014), the posterior
insula (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007) and the premotor cortex
(Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2014; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Petkova et al., 2011; Tsakiris
et al., 2007).
The findings of the involvement of both the TPJ and insula in the processing of
the bodily self are of interest in terms of linking the bodily self to more socially and
affectively relevant forms of self-representation as both have been associated with
social and emotional cognitive processes. The TJP is activated during perspective
taking and thinking about others (Carter & Huettel, 2013; Santiesteban, Banissy,
Catmur, & Bird, 2012). The relationship between self-representation and the insula
is more complex. Several recent meta-analyses of the insula (Chang, Yarkoni,
Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013; Deen, Pitskel, & Pelphrey, 2011) have suggested evidence
for a tripartite division between three areas: a posterior region (PI) which is thought
to be a key hub for integrating booth internal and external signals relating to the
body (Craig, 2009); a ventroanterior region (vAI) which is the region most strongly
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linked to the processing of emotional (Morita et al., 2013; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson,
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) and social information (Lindner et al., 2013; Xiang,
Lohrenz, & Montague, 2013); and a dorsoanterior region (dAI) involved in higher-
level cognitive processing such as attention (Eckert et al., 2009). However, despite
these functional differentiations, it is important to note that these areas show
significant reciprocal connections between them with signals about the body
processed in PI feeding into social–affective processing in vAI and into conscious
awareness via attentional processing in the dAI (Craig, 2009; Simmons et al., 2013).
Conceptual Self
The conceptual self is generally thought to be made up of one’s attitudes and beliefs
about one’s values, preferences, past experiences and social roles (Kuhl, Quirin, &
Koole, 2015). In contrast to the bodily self, the conceptual self is thought to emerge
gradually during development via the association and organisation of intra- and
interpersonal information closely related to one’s behaviour and goals into a
coherent network of self-relevant associations (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Perugini &
Leone, 2009). The formation of the conceptual self relies on our interactions with
others, particularly through linguistic and cultural identification (Gallagher, 2000;
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1913, 1935; Neisser,
1991). In addition, the fact that the conceptual self is closely associated with
autobiographical memories means that it plays a central role in the maintenance of
personal identity over time (Charlesworth, Allen, & Havelka, 2016; Damasio, 1999;
Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013).
Social interaction appears to play a clear role in the development of the
conceptual self. This aspect has been addressed by Nelson (2003), who has detailed
how, as children begin to learn language, they are taught by caregivers to narrate the
events of their lives. These narratives begin by being highly localised and simplistic,
requiring a large amount of prompting from the care giver, e.g. ‘‘What sort of
animals did you see at the circus?’’ (Fivush & Nelson, 2006). However, over time
children learn to develop these narratives on their own, which adds a new awareness
of self in past and future experiences. This also allows them to develop the ability to
contrast their own past and future self-narratives to those of others.
The type of scaffolding that the child receives plays a key role in shaping distinct
variations in self-perception across culture and gender. For example, parents tend to be
more elaborative when developing narratives with daughters than with sons which
may explain why by their fourth year girls talk more about feelings and thoughts in
personal experiences than boys (Fivush, 2011). Fivush and Nelson (2004) argue that
the cultural differences in conceptions of selfhood between Western and Eastern
cultures (for reviews see Cohen, Leung, & Hoshino-Browne, 2007; Markus &
Kitayama, 2010) can be traced back to differences in the way that carers in the West
and East support their children in developing narratives in autobiographical memory.
They note findings that mothers from Western cultures talk about the past in more
elaborate and emotional language and tend to focus on the child’s own experience of
events while mothers from Eastern cultures tend to emphasis the communal setting of
events and to highlight the moral emotions and lessons that emerge from experiences
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(Leichtman, Wang, & Pillmer, 2003). These differences in the style of scaffolding
appear to continue across life with both older children and adults from Western
cultures tending to havemore detailed, elaborate and emotional narratives of their past
than their counterparts in Eastern cultures (Pillmer, 1998).
Research in neuroscience on the conceptual self has largely focused on
comparing neural activity when people are viewing stimuli related to self (e.g.
self-relevant traits, own name, own face, autobiographical memories) as opposed to
stimuli related to others. Several key regions along the cortical midline appear to
show greater activation to self-related stimuli than other-related stimuli (Heatherton,
2006; Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff, Qin, & Feinberg, 2011), including the anterior
cingulate cortex (Leshikar, Cassidy, & Gutchess, 2016), the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) and the vAI (Murray, Debbané, Fox, Bzdok, & Eickhoff, 2015). The mPFC
is particularly involved in the processing of information about people’s traits,
preferences and beliefs (Frith & Frith, 2003; Ma, Baetens, Vandekerckhove, Van
der Cruyssen, & Van Overwalle, 2013; Schilbach, 2015) and shows sensitivity to a
number of social factors including social status and ostracism (Muscatell et al.,
2012; Powers, Wagner, Norris, & Heatherton, 2013). Importantly, there is now
considerable evidence for a ventral dorsal split within the mPFC, with the ventral
region (vMPFC) showing greater involvement in the processing of self-relevant
traits, while the dorsal region (dMPFC) is involving in processing the traits of
dissimilar others (Araujo, Kaplan, & Damasio, 2013; Denny, Kober, Wager, &
Ochsner, 2012; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Moore, Merchant, Kahn, &
Pfeifer, 2014; Powell, Macrae, Cloutier, Metcalfe, & Mitchell, 2010).
Further evidence for the role of the vmPFC in representing the conceptual self
comes from studies showing cultural differences in vmPFC activation during self-
processing. Zhu, Zhang, Fan, and Han (2007) scanned Western and Chinese
participants while thinking about either their own traits, their mother’s traits or a
politician’s traits. They found that while Western participants showed vmPFC
activation only when thinking about themselves, Chinese participants, whose
culture emphasises the interdependent nature of the self, showed mPFC activation in
both the self and mother conditions suggesting that their brains were processing
their mother’s traits as self-relevant. A follow-up study showed that when students
from Hong Kong, who can be considered bicultural due to the long period of British
rule, are primed with Western identities they showed increased vmPFC differen-
tiation between self and mother compared to when they were primed with Chinese
identities (Ng, Han, Mao, & Lai, 2010). Similar modulations of vmPFC activity
have also be seen between Chinese students in America who have become less
interdependent since arriving compared to those who became more interdependent
(Chen, Wagner, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2015). In addition, Chiao et al. (2009)
showed that across cultures those with a more independent view of the self showed
greater mPFC when thinking about general self-traits, e.g. ‘‘I am truthful’’, while
those with an interdependent view of the self showed greater mPFC when thinking
about contextual self-traits, e.g. ‘‘When talking to my mother I am truthful’’. The
vmPFC has also been shown to have greater activation to objects owned by the
participant (Kim & Johnson, 2012), suggesting a role in representing an extended
‘‘material’’ self as well as an extended social self.
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In addition to holding information about self-relevant traits, preferences, etc., the
conceptual self is also thought to strongly rely on autobiographical information
stored in episodic memory. Meta-analyses of imaging studies have shown that
autobiographical memory tasks recruit similar vmPFC areas to self-trait processing
along with a number of other brain areas including the hippocampus (Spreng, Mar,
& Kim, 2009; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006). Furthermore, a recent study
examined functional connectivity between the hippocampus and neocortex during
the retrieval and elaboration of episodic memories and found that while the dmPFC
is functionally coupled to the hippocampus during the retrieval of memories the
vmPFC strongly coupled to it both during retrieval and when participants are
required to relive the memory in elaborate detail (McCormick, St-Laurent, Ty,
Valiante, & McAndrews, 2015). These results further demonstrate the importance of
the vmPFC to the processing and experience of the conceptual self.
Integrating the Bodily and Conceptual Self
Until recently, there have been few attempts to consider the relationship between the
bodily and conceptual self, or how the brain’s representations of the bodily and
conceptual selves interact. Farmer and Tsakiris (2012) suggested one possible
branch between the two forms of selfhood by outlining the concept of a bodily
social self, which is the first form of selfhood in which one’s self is represented as
an object of others’ perceptions. The development of the bodily social self is closely
entangled with the ability to represent others as having their own perspective,
separate from one’s own. This form of selfhood is also still considered ultimately
bodily as, at least in its developmentally primitive form, it is thought to first rely
upon recognising the commonality of one’s own body to those of others. A similar
tripartite distinction has been made by Sugiura (2013) who distinguishes between
three different self-schemas: the physical self-schema which roughly corresponds to
the bodily self described here; the interpersonal self-schema which emerges due to
social interaction and processes how the self is perceived by other individuals; and
the social-value self-schema which processes a more general sense of the self
relative to others and is involved in the ascription of traits and social roles to the
self. This social-value self roughly corresponds to the conceptual self as discussed in
this article. Importantly, both of these two models of the self allow for cross-talk
between the different forms of self-representation, which can allow changes in one
form of self-representation to affect changes at another level in a hierarchical
manner (see Feinberg, 2011 for an additional tripartite hierarchical model of the
self).
In terms of neural links between bodily and conceptual self-representation, so far
there have been few direct attempts to understand how the neural regions involved
in the bodily self and the conceptual self influence each other. However, one recent
meta-analysis of fMRI studies sought to identify common regions activated both
when participants perceived their own face and when the saw self-relevant traits (Hu
et al., 2016). The authors found that the only regions to show an overlap in
activation across both tasks were the dorsal anterior cingulate and the vAI,
suggesting that these regions may play a key role in specifying self-relevance across
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different domains. The finding of vAI activation is of particular significance given
its role in processing interoceptive signals (Craig, 2009) and the role of the AI more
generally in the processing of body ownership (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Limanowski
et al., 2014). It should be noted, however, that the sense of bodily self used by Hu
et al. related to the recognition of one’s own face from the outside and as such
significantly differed from the sense of the bodily self described above which is
grounded in the ongoing multisensory perception of bodily signals from both
interceptive and exteroceptive senses rather than mere recognition of visual
representations of the self. As such, it is still unclear whether there is any specific
brain area that is directly involved in processing all self-related information, or if the
different types of neural self-representation interact with each other through
connections between distinct networks.
The Self and Prejudice
Now that we have discussed the cognitive and neural bases, we will briefly highlight
the strong interconnections between both bodily and conceptual self-representation
and our social interactions with others. While the interconnections between the self
and society are numerous and diverse, here we will focus on the relationship
between the self and prejudice.
Prejudice and the Conceptual Self
Work on the relationship between the conceptual self and prejudice has a long
pedigree. Tajfel (1974, 1982) emphasised the important role that in-group/out-group
distinctions played in how individuals perceived themselves. He suggested that
identifying with a larger group plays a key role in establishing an individual’s
identity and self-worth and further that this leads the in-group to be strongly
associated with the self such that threats to the group are perceived as threating the
individual’s own self-concept. In support of this view, work on the formation of
minimal groups shows that participants tend to show an in-group bias even for
social groups with little meaningful distinctions between them and further that
people tend to use inferences about the self to anchor their judgements about the in-
group (Otten, 2003). This process of in-group identification is highly likely to lead
to prejudice as individuals will favour their own group and in some cases disparage
the out-group in order to increase their sense of self-worth (Chang, Hodgins, Lin, &
Huang, 2014; Mackie & Smith, 2002).
Empirical support for this position has come from a series of studies investigating
the role of self-esteem and self-threat on intergroup prejudice. A series of studies
have demonstrated that threats to the self either via reminder of mortality (Burke,
Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Maj & Kossowska, 2015) or through negative feedback
about oneself (Allen & Sherman, 2011; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Spencer, Fein,
Wolfe, Fong, & Duinn, 1998) can lead participants to increase their reliance on
negative stereotypes about others. Allen and Sherman demonstrated that this effect
was due to a greater focus on the negative attributes of out-groups, suggesting that
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these effects do represent a means of self-protection through the devaluation of non-
self groups. Interestingly Rudman, Dohn and Fairchild (2007) showed that this
process of self-enhancement could lead to prejudice even when the original threat to
the self was that they displayed prejudice leading to ‘‘ironic racism’’. The authors
also demonstrated that a process of self-affirmation following threat to self
prevented the increase in intergroup prejudice by removing the need to protect self-
worth.
In contrast to the role of self-threat on out-group prejudice, research has
suggested that trait self-esteem has little bearing on prejudice towards other groups,
although there is some evidence for differences in prejudice between high and low
self-esteem participants expression of prejudice depending on whether in-group bias
is measured explicitly or implicitly (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000). However,
further research has distinguished between two types of self-esteem: explicit, i.e.
what people report their self-esteem to be, and implicit, i.e. self-representations that
operate largely outside conscious awareness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Jordan,
Spencer and Zanna (2005) found that participants with high explicit but low implicit
self-esteem showed increased prejudice against out-groups after self-threat, whereas
those with high explicit and implicit self-esteem did not. This indicated that those
with high implicit self-esteem either have a greater ability to suppress the impulse to
derogate others or that they have greater internal self-affirmation so do not need to
derogate others in order to enhance their self-worth.
How people conceptualise themselves has also been shown to affect the way they
respond to prejudice from others. McCoy and Major (2003) found that women who
identified strongly with their gender showed more signs of depressed affect and
greater reductions in self-esteem when receiving a negative evaluation based on
sexist stereotypes, as compared to women who did not identify strongly with their
gender. Similarly, among Latino-Americans, group identification was positively
correlated with depressed affect when reading about discrimination to an in-group
member, but negatively related to depressed affect when reading about discrim-
ination towards an ethnic out-group. However, recent work has exposed a more
complex picture by demonstrating that while personally experiencing racial
discrimination decreases self-esteem, the perception of increased discrimination
against other members of one’s ethnic group can lead to enhanced self-esteem
(Armenta & Hunt, 2009). This appears to occur through a process by which greater
perception of group discrimination leads to greater identification with the in-group
which in turn bolsters self-identity and self-worth.
The final source of evidence for the importance of the conceptual self to research
on prejudice comes from neuroimaging studies of the brain basis of prejudice that
highlight an important role for two key self-related areas, the vmPFC and the AI
(Amodio, 2014). As discussed above, the vmPFC is heavily implicated in the
representation of the conceptual self. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that it is
also sensitive to prejudice against other social groups. fMRI studies have
demonstrated attenuated vmPFC activation when observing members of social
groups that elicit feelings of disgust, e.g. homeless people and drug addicts (Harris
& Fiske, 2007), and when men with sexist attitudes observe sexualised images of
women (but not men) (Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 2011). Furthermore, a recent
332 Soc Just Res (2017) 30:323–354
123
study used transcranial direct current stimulation to increase activation in the mPFC
while participants carried out a task measuring implicit racial bias and showed that
stimulation of this region led to a decrease in racial bias (Sellaro et al., 2015).
In contrast, both the vAI and dAI have been found to show increased activation
for out-groups compared to in-groups (Richeson et al., 2003; Ronquillo et al., 2007).
While both AI regions have been strongly implicated in self-processing, their role as
a centre for interoceptive information processing means that they are also linked to
the visceral representation of emotion and particularly negative affect (Nitschke,
Sarinopoulos, MacKiewicz, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006). Thus, it has been
suggested that AI activation in prejudice studies represents the negative subjective
feelings that participants experience when perceiving an out-group (Harris & Fiske,
2006; Knutson, Mah, Manly, & Grafman, 2007).
Prejudice and the Bodily Self
While the role of the conceptual self in prejudice has received a considerable
amount of attention over the years, the role of the bodily self in social cognition has
only recently begun to be appreciated. The key spur towards interest in this area was
the discovery of ‘‘mirror neurons’’ in the macaque premotor and parietal cortices.
These neurons fired both when the monkey performed an action, and when they
observed the actions of another, suggesting a link between executing one’s own
movements and understanding the actions of others (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi,
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996).
Neuroimaging studies (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009; Molen-
berghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012) and more recently single-cell recordings
(Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010) have demonstrated similar
activations in humans.
Further research has suggested that similar systems of shared representation of
self and other exist for perception of pain (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Fitzgibbon,
Giummarra, Georgiou-Karistianis, Enticott, & Bradshaw, 2010), touch (Keysers,
Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010; Schaefer, Heinze, & Rotte, 2012) and emotional processing
(Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Jabbi, Bastiaansen, & Keysers, 2008).
While there is still considerable debate about exactly how these shared activations
contribute towards the understanding of others (see the following reviews for three
distinct accounts: Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Gallese, 2007; Kilner,
Friston, & Frith, 2007), the involvement of neural systems involved in representing
the bodily self in social cognition is now well established.
These shared regions for the processing of the actions and sensations of one’s
own body and that of others have also been shown to be sensitive to a number of
different social factors including prejudice. In the motor domain, Gutsell and
Inzlicht (2010) tested White participants and found less mu suppression, a sign of
motor cortex activation, when viewing actions performed by a member of a racial
out-group compared to when viewing those of a White person. Moreover, the
amount of mu suppression attenuation was modulated by the prejudice of the
participant. Similar results have been found using transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) (Désy & Théoret, 2007; Molnar-Szakacs, Wu, Robles, & Iacoboni, 2007)
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and fMRI (Liew, Han, & Aziz-Zadeh, 2011). Interestingly, a follow-up study on
White participants found that differences in mu suppression for Black versus White
actors were abolished when the actors made a threatening action (Gutsell & Inzlicht,
2013). Similarly, Rauchbauer, Majdandžić, Stieger, and Lamm (2016) showed that
when White participants viewed an angry Black face while observing gestures, they
showed greater interference in executing their actions than seeing an angry White
face. These findings suggest that for White participants, threatening actions of Black
individuals are given greater priority in processing. This may be a result of out-
group faces being perceived as more threatening, and so more important to predict
and rapidly react to (Farmer, Apps, & Tsakiris, 2016).
Moving from the motor to the sensory domain, prejudice has been shown to have
particularly strong effects on the processing of other’s pain. Xu, Zuo, Wang, and
Han (2009) demonstrated that when participants observed painful stimuli being
applied to members of their own racial group, they showed increased activation in
both the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the vAI, both areas known to be
involved in processing one’s own pain. However, when observing members of a
different racial group receiving pain, activation in both these areas was significantly
attenuated. Further research has shown that this attenuation of empathy for pain in
out-group members is modulated both by implicit racial bias (Avenanti, Sirigu, &
Aglioti, 2010; Azevedo et al., 2013) and perceived similarity with the other person
(Azevedo et al., 2013).
Prejudice has also been shown to modulate the mirroring of touch and emotions.
Serino, Giovagnoli, and Làdavas (2009) demonstrated this using a paradigm called
visual remapping of touch, in which observing touch on another’s face leads to
greater accuracy in tactile perception on one’s own face. They found that this effect
was reduced when observing a face from a different racial group. They also found a
similar reduction when people viewed the face of a politician from an opposing
political party, demonstrating that the effect was based on social, rather than purely
physical, self-similarity. Similar findings have been reported in emotional process-
ing. Gutsell and Inzlicht (2012) found that while viewing members of a racial in-
group being sad led to similar neural activation as being sad oneself, this effect was
reduced for members of a racial out-group. Again, this effect was mediated by
prejudice towards the out-group, suggesting that social identification rather than
purely physical similarity is the key factor in group-based modulations of shared
representations.
In addition to its effect on the activation of shared bodily representations, such as
touch, emotions and pain, social group membership has also been shown to affect
bodily responses during social interactions. Müller et al. (2011) showed that White
participants showed an interference effect when performing contrasting actions in
tandem with White actor but not with a Black actor. Similarly, Sacheli and
colleagues (2015) found that when interacting with an in-group but not an out-group
avatar the actions of the other person interfered with people’s own action execution
and that this effect was mediated by participant’s implicit racial bias. Further
evidence of prejudice affecting bodily interaction with others come from studies of
mimicry, the unconscious tendency we have to imitate the facial and bodily
movements of others, which is thought to be a method of increasing affiliation
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(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Hale & Hamilton, 2016). This tendency to mimic
another person is reduced when the person belongs to a social or racial out-group
(Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Liebert et al., 1972; Losin, Iacoboni, Martin, Cross, &
Dapretto, 2012; Neely, Heckel, & Leichtman, 1973; van der Schalk et al., 2011;
Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008), and the extent to which we mimic out-group members
is negatively related to our implicit prejudice against them. For example, Yabar,
Johnston, Miles and Peace (2006) found greater mimicry of a non-Christian
confederate than of a Christian confederate among non-Christian participants. They
also found that the amount of actions of the Christian that participants mimicked
was positively correlated with their implicit attitudes towards Christians.
Changing the Self to Change Social Attitudes
In the previous section, we discussed the strong links between self-representations
and prejudice. However, the role that self-representation can play in the
establishment and manifestation of prejudice also suggests that changing self-
representations may be a viable means of reducing prejudice. In this final section,
we will look at evidence for the malleability of both the conceptual and bodily self
and how that malleability can be harnessed in the aims of reducing prejudice. We
will conclude by considering how current developments in technology are making
changes in self-representation both more immersive and accessible, and consider
some of the opportunities and risks of such developments for reducing racial bias.
Reducing Prejudice Through the Conceptual Self
Most studies aiming to alter the self in order to reduce prejudice have focussed on
the conceptual self. Lai et al. (2014) tested 17 different interventions for reducing
racial bias and found that amount of self-involvement was a key predictor of
success. Here, we will consider a number of different ways the conceptual self can
be modified ranging from simple associative learning between the self and others,
through changes in group identity or self-construal and finally changes in
perspective taking.
Associative Learning
Perhaps the most abstract means for altering the conceptual self is the linking of the
self with another through associative learning. In the last few years, there has been
an increased interest in investigating how associating different stimuli with the self
can change how that stimuli are processed. This research has established that simply
training people to associate self-relevant words (i.e. their own name or the word
‘‘You’’) with particular shapes can lead to improved perceptual processing of those
shapes (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2015). Similar perceptual
effects have also been found when the same items are associated with rewards,
suggesting that the effect is due to the greater value people assign themselves
compared to others (Sui et al., 2012). In line with this, it has been shown that
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associating the self with a particular soft drink led to more positive implicit attitudes
towards that drink but that this effect is mediated by self-esteem, with the increase
in attitude being greatest for those with high self-esteem and less for those with low
self-esteem (Prestwich, Perugini, Hurling, & Richetin, 2010). The neural basis of
the effect of self-association on perceptual processing has been shown to be due to
increased coupling between vmPFC, which as described above plays a key role in
self-processing, and the left superior temporal sulcus, an area known to play an
important role in directing attention to external stimuli (Sui, Rotshtein, &
Humphreys, 2013).
Similar effects of self-association have also been found for more socially relevant
stimuli. Payne, Tsakiris, and Maister (2016) demonstrated that labelling the faces of
others as being self-relevant in a brief learning task led to increased perceptual
processing of the other’s face as compared to non-self-associated faces. In addition,
self-association has been shown to enhance visual perspective taking. Participants
were faster to take the perspective of an avatar associated with the self than with
non-self-relevant avatars and showed greater interference when their own perspec-
tive and that of the self-tagged avatar were in conflict (Mattan, Quinn, Apperly, Sui,
& Rotshtein, 2015).
Group Membership and Self-Construal
At present, there have been no published studies that sought to investigate whether
this basic method of self-association can impact upon prejudice towards an out-
group. However, a more naturalistic way of eliciting a self-association with
individuals of an out-group is to assign individuals to a ‘‘new’’ social group the
definitions of which cut across existing social boundaries. Kurzban, Tooby, and
Cosmides (2001) demonstrated that memory biases in favour of a racial in-group
(White people) against a racial out-group (Black people) could be removed by four
minutes of training that led to the association of some faces from each group as
members of the same team as the participant with the effects previously associated
with race now applying to the newly created in-group/out-group categories.
The creation of a new in-group has since been shown to modulate more direct
measures of prejudice. For example, placing a participant in an arbitrary team with
members of a racial out-group reduces racial prejudice against those members (Van
Bavel & Cunningham, 2009). Similarly, Sheng and Han (2012) found that including
members of a racial out-group as a member of one’s own team for competitions
eliminated an in-group bias in participants’ neural response to pained facial
expressions. However, in both studies this effect did not appear to generalise to
racial out-group members who were part of the opposing team, nor to those who
were not members of either team, suggesting it has limited generalisability as a
means of consistently reducing prejudice. A more powerful version of linking the
self to out-group members was reported by (Lai et al., 2014). Here, non-Black
participants played dodgeball on a team composed fully of Black players, against an
all-White player team. This method was found to be highly effective at reducing
racial prejudice. This suggests that to reduce prejudice in a generalised manner, it
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may be necessary to both raise self-identification with the out-group and reduce
identification with the in-group.
Prejudice towards an out-group can also be altered by changing self-construal.
Wang, Wu, Liu, Wu, and Han (2014) showed that priming Chinese participants with
independent self-construal, which emphasises the self as an individual, as opposed
to interdependent self-construal, which emphasises the self as situated with in a
social group, led to decreased in-group bias in the neural response to pain in the
mid-cingulate, supplementary motor area and AI. This suggests that conceptualising
oneself as independent from one’s own social group leads to a corresponding
decrease in bias towards that group in empathic neural processing.
Perspective Taking
Although laboratory-based self-association procedures lack ecological validity,
there is evidence to suggest that more naturalistic processes may elicit the formation
of similar self-associations. One example of this is perspective taking, which is the
process of imagining oneself in the position of another individual. Importantly, this
process not only leads to a reduction in prejudice against others, but it appears to
achieve this by creating a new association between the self and that other. A number
of studies have demonstrated that taking the perspective of the member of a social
out-group can lead to reduced in-group bias and more positive attitudes towards that
group (Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Shih, Wang, Trahan
Bucher, & Stotzer, 2009; Todd & Burgmer, 2013; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci,
2003). Furthermore, Müller et al. (2011) found that an in-group bias in motor
interference disappeared when White participants took the perspective of their
Black interaction partner.
Crucially, there is now strong evidence that this change in attitudes is driven by
an increase in self-association towards the other rather than alternative possibilities
such as an increase in empathy for the other person. For example, Galinsky and Ku
(2004) found that participants’ own self-esteem mediated the change in social
attitudes caused by perspective taking while Todd and Burgmer (2013) showed that
the effects of perspective taking on improved social attitudes were diminished when
participants were primed with negative self-related information. In addition, Marini,
Rubichi, and Sartori (2012) found that imagining one’s self being helped by an out-
group improved participant’s attitudes towards that out-group whereas imaging
another person being helped did not. Another recent study demonstrated that
actively taking the perspective of a black character who experienced racial bias in a
computer game led to a greater reduction in implicit racial bias than merely reading
the about the same experience through text did (Gutierrez et al., 2014). It should be
noted, however, that Lai et al. (2014) found no evidence that perspective taking of
an out-group member led to reduced bias towards that out-group. This fact may be
explained by the fact that in their study the method of perspective taking used was
relatively basic consisting of simply seeing a person’s face and a short sentence
about them. In contrast, the more successful instances of perspective taking tend to
involve more immersive techniques such as writing a short essay from the other’s
perspective (Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Todd & Burgmer, 2013), writing their views
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about a film clip featuring an out-group member (Shih et al., 2009) or taking the role
of an out-group member in a computer game (Gutierrez et al., 2014).
The role of perspective taking in changing social attitudes may also explain
findings that fiction about the experiences of members of other groups can lead to
increased empathy and positive attitudes towards those groups (Bilali & Vollhardt,
2013; Hakemulder, 2000, 2008; Johnson, Jasper, Griffin, & Huffman, 2013; Paluck,
2007; Vezzali, Stathi, Giovannini, Capozza, & Trifiletti, 2015). Several researchers
have suggested that fiction has a functional role as a form of technology which
allows us to experience the world through the eyes of others and thus allows us to
identify more closely with them blurring the boundary between self and other
(Koopman & Hakemulder, 2015; Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 2016). Indeed, some
authors have argued that, through allowing people to emphasise with others of a
different gender, class or nationality, the growth in literacy and explosion of
literature during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries played a key role in the
development of the idea of universal human rights (Hunt, 2007; Pinker, 2011).
While the exact characteristics of fiction that produce increased positive attitudes
and greater empathy towards others are difficult to disentangle due to its
multifaceted nature, the act of associating with another via stepping into their
role has been highlighted as particularly relevant (Koopman & Hakemulder, 2015;
Oatley, 2016). Given that many (e.g. Dennett, 1991; Goffman, 1959; Polkinghorne,
1991) have suggested that the conceptual self is itself reliant on our ability to craft
narratives about our own lives, it is perhaps unsurprising the vicariously
experiencing the life of another can lead to changes in self-identification.
Reducing Prejudice Through the Bodily Self
Having outlined how changing the conceptual self can alter social attitudes, we now
turn to whether the malleability of the bodily self can also be harnessed to alter
social views. Although the links between the bodily self and social processing are
somewhat less clear than for the conceptual self, the past few years have seen
increased interest in this question. Here, we will first consider two key ways by
which altering the bodily self may influence social attitudes towards others, before
moving on to discuss how technological innovations are making this topic
increasingly relevant.
Synchrony, Imitation and Social Interaction
The first method of changing social attitudes through the bodily self comes from
studies on the power of synchronous movement and mimicry to improve
cooperation. Synchronous movement plays an important part in building social
affiliation; many social situations that are known to increase affiliation involve
synchronised movement in some way. Dancing is one of the clearest instances of
social synchrony, and it has been argued that the human propensity for dance and
music has emerged as the result of an adaptation to facilitate group bonding and the
sense of being part of a tight-knit community (Brown, 2000; Levitin, 2008). Crowds
at sporting events, religious gatherings and political rallies will often chant, sing and
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move in synchrony, Japanese corporations have long used communal exercise such
as Tai Chi to encourage a sense of team work among their employees, and soldiers
are trained to march in step in order to develop the feeling of being part of a
cohesive unit. It has been suggested that the power of synchrony in social situations
stems from the fact that synchronous action blurs the boundary between self and
other, causing the sense of bodily selfhood to expand to include the other (Farmer &
Tsakiris, 2012; Pacherie, 2014).
Experimental studies have demonstrated that moving in synchrony with others
has a significant effect on people’s reported feelings towards interaction partners
and leads to the building of affiliation (Hove & Risen, 2009), increased attraction
(Nowak, Watt, & Walther, 2005) and compassion (Valdesolo & Desteno, 2011). A
number of other studies have used techniques from behavioural economics to
investigate to what extent synchrony can affect people’s actual behaviour. For
example, both walking and singing in synchrony with a group of others lead to
greater group cooperation in economic games (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). In
addition, Launay, Dean, and Bailes (2013) found that simply seeing another person
tapping in time with one’s actions is enough to increase monetary investments in a
trust game. Fischer, Callander, Reddish, and Bulbulia (2013) used an even more
ecologically valid approach by having participants take part in real religious rituals
that involved varying degrees of synchronised movement. They showed that the
amount of synchrony involved in a ritual was a key factor in increasing the amount
of money offered by participants in a subsequent public goods game. The same
authors also found that the effect of synchronous action on pro-social behaviour was
not confined to interaction partners but also encompassed non-partners, indicating
that synchronous action can act as a general prime towards pro-social behaviour
(Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer, 2014). This last finding suggests that the effects of
synchronous action with one member of a social out-group may generalise towards
other out-group members.
At present, there have been relatively few studies investigating how synchrony
affects attitudes towards other social groups. However, one recent study by
Tunçgenç & Cohen (2016) found that synchronous movements between two
minimally defined groups of children lead to greater bonding between the groups
than did asynchronous movements. However, other studies have examined how the
closely related concept of imitation can change attitudes towards more established
social out-groups. Inzlicht, Gutsell, and Legault (2012) found that after imitating the
actions of a Black model, White participants showed more positive implicit attitudes
towards Black people. This was not the case when the participants imitated a White
model or when they simply watched the actions of a Black model, suggesting that
both exposure to the out-group and similarity between the movements of self and
other in are necessary for changing attitudes. There is also evidence that being
mimicked by an out-group can improve social attitudes. In a study by Hasler,
Hirschberger, Shani-Sherman, and Friedman (2014), Israeli participants discuss the
issue of the wall between Israel and Palestine with a virtual avatar of a Palestinian
whose postural movements were either the same (mimicry) or the opposite (non-
mimicry) of their own. They found that participants who were mimicked showed
increased positive affect towards their interaction partners and greater empathy with
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the situation of the Palestinians more generally, as assessed by their responses
during the interaction. However, mimicry did not affect their explicit feeling
towards Palestinians as a whole, suggesting that further work is required to
determine whether mimicry by one out-group member leads to improved attitudes
for the whole group.
Embodiment
While similarity of bodily movements during social interaction suggests one
naturalistic way to alter the relationship between self and others on a bodily level,
recent scientific and technological developments are allowing us to go further by
changing the direct perception of our own body compared to others. In this section,
we will outline the evidence from studies using virtual reality (VR) and bodily
illusions showing that we can successfully embody out-group members, before
moving on to discuss the opportunities and challenges that the growing availability
of VR technology offers for changing social attitudes.
Over the last decade, there has been increased interest in how multisensory-
induced changes in body representations can lead to changes in social attitudes. The
earliest work in this area was a study by Yee & Bailenson (2006) in which
participants wore a head mounted display (HMD) which placed them in a virtual
body while tracking their head movements, creating a sense of visual-motor
synchrony that allowed for the experience of ownership of their virtual avatar. The
study found that when participants were given an avatar with an elderly face they
subsequently showed reduced negative stereotyping of the elderly. However, this
study did not test for effects of embodiment on implicit bias, and many of the
participants guessed the purpose of the study leaving open the possibility that the
findings were driven by demand characteristics (McCambridge, de Bruin, & Witton,
2012).
More recent work has sought to test the effect of embodiment on prejudice in a
more implicit manner. In a series of studies, the authors of the current paper used the
rubber hand illusion (RHI) to show that synchronous visual-tactile stimulation over
a Black hand decreased implicit racial bias towards Black people in White
participants (Farmer, Maister, & Tsakiris, 2014; Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez, &
Tsakiris, 2012; Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, & Tsakiris, 2013). Importantly, two of
these studies (Farmer et al., 2012; Maister et al., 2013) found that the amount that
participant’s racial bias decreased was correlated with the strength of the ownership
they felt for the hand, suggesting that this effect is partly caused by the increased
overlap between the self and the racial out-group. Effects of embodiment on racial
bias have also been found when using VR to generate a full-body illusion (Peck,
Seinfeld, Aglioti, & Slater, 2013) and similar changes in implicit attitudes to
children have been found after embodying a child avatar (Banakou, Groten, &
Slater, 2013). However, another recent study (Estudillo & Bindemann, 2016) found
no evidence that multisensory stimulation of the face led to changes in racial bias.
This may be due to the fact that, unlike the RHI or the full-body illusion, visual-
tactile stimulation to the face does not produce a strong subjective feeling of
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embodiment, probably due to the greater distinctiveness of facial features compared
to representations of hands or even body shape.
In addition to these effects on implicit bias, multisensory stimulation has also
been shown to affect more low-level sensorimotor measures of prejudice. Fini,
Cardini, Tajadura-Jiménez, Serino, and Tsakiris (2013) found that synchronous
touch on one’s own face and that of a racial out-group member served to eliminate
in-group bias in the extent to which we ‘‘resonate’’ with other people’s tactile
experiences (the ‘‘visual remapping of touch’’ effect). Furthermore, this change was
mediated by participant’s pre-existing implicit racial bias, with the greatest change
occurring for those with the most bias. In another example of self-other merging,
Maister, Cardini, Zamariola, Serino, and Tsakiris (2015) showed that multisensory
stimulation of one’s own face and another led to a remapping of one’s own
peripersonal space onto the body of the other. Another recent study combined
research on embodiment and imitation by showing that White participants
embodying a Black avatar showed a greater tendency to imitate the posture and
movements of a Black virtual character than a White one while the opposite applied
when they embodied a White avatar (Hasler, Spanlang, & Slater, 2017). These
examples highlight the role that embodiment can play in blurring the boundaries
between self and other and its value in changing both attitudes and more low-level
bodily responses towards other social groups and individuals.
Future Directions: Changing Attitudes via Embodiment Outside
the Laboratory
Having considered the current evidence for the effectiveness of embodiment in
changing social attitudes, we now wish to consider how these findings might be
harnessed in order to help reduce prejudice outside of the laboratory, and also
highlight possible pitfalls that such efforts will have to overcome. The past year has
seen the launch of several commercial VR systems such as the Oculus Rift, the HTC
Vive and the Samsung Gear which are capable of supporting the visual-motor
synchrony necessary to allow the experience of embodiment.
There is now considerable interest from game designers, artists and journalists
about how such technology could be used to better immerse people in virtual worlds
and increase their empathy with others. For example, the BBC recently released a
360 3D video from the Calais migrant camp which aimed to give viewers a more
full and immersive view of the conditions that residents of the camp must endure
(BBC, 2016). Another example is ‘‘The Machine to Be Another’’, which is an
innovative collaboration between scientists and artists in Barcelona which has used
the body-swap illusion developed by Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) to allow users to
experience what it is like to have the body of another gender, a dancer or a person
with disabilities (Be Another Lab, 2016; Souppouris, 2014). VR embodiment has
also been applied in clinical settings and is being used in the treatment for
psychiatric conditions (Riva, Banos, Botella, Mantovani, & Gaggioli, 2016;
Valmaggia, Latif, Kempton, & Rus-Calafell, 2016) and stroke rehabilitation
(Iruthayarajah, McIntyre, Cotoi, Macaluso, & Teasell, 2016; Teo et al., 2016).
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Given the relative novelty of VR, there are only a limited number of studies that
have been conducted on its effects. Therefore, there are many questions that need to
be answered empirically before the opportunities and risks of VR can be truly
appreciated. For example, at present it is unknown how long the effect of
embodiment on prejudice reduction lasts. The studies mentioned in the previous
section all measured the effects of embodiment on implicit attitudes immediately
after the end of the embodiment session, and whether such interventions lead to
long-term changes in attitudes remains to be seen. The neural basis of embodiment’s
power to change social attitudes is also currently unknown, and future research
should aim to ascertain how these changes at the level of the bodily self are able to
lead to changes in brain areas involved in the processing of higher-level conceptual
self-representations such as the vmPFC.
For the moment, however, it is possible to extrapolate what we know from non-
VR computer games in order to make some predictions regarding the effects of VR
embodiment on prejudice reduction and empathy. Although the avatars that we
control in standard computer games are not fully embodied, they are tied to the self
via association and have been relatively well studied by cognitive scientists. Several
studies have shown that taking another’s identity in a computer game leads to more
positive attitudes towards that other, via a generalisation of positive self-
associations to the other (Blake, Hefner, Roth, Klimmt, & Vorderer, 2012; Lewis,
Weber, & Bowman, 2008; Li, Liau, & Khoo, 2013). Importantly, this generalisation
of associations between self and other during computer game play is not
unidirectional; in fact, there is considerable evidence that taking on the identity
of another leads to changes in self-processing based on our beliefs and stereotypes
about that other, a phenomena known as the Proteus effect (Yee & Bailenson, 2007;
Yee, Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 2009).
The Proteus effect has been shown to manifest under various different conditions.
Yee and Bailenson (2007) found that giving people an attractive avatar led them to
be more open and intimate with a confederate, while giving them a taller avatar led
them to behave more confidently in a negotiating task. Similarly, having an obese
avatar has been shown to lead men to expend less exercise during a computer based
sports game (Peña, Khan, & Alexopoulos, 2016) and controlling an avatar dressed
as a member of the Ku Klux Klan lead people to create more aggressive and less
affiliative narratives than controlling an avatar dressed as a doctor (Peña, Hancock,
& Merola, 2009). Other studies have shown that the Proteus effect also applies to
fully embodied VR; Freeman et al. (2014) showed that embodying a short avatar led
to more negative self-evaluation and greater feelings or paranoia, while Rosenberg,
Baughman, and Bailenson (2013) showed that, after embodying an avatar with the
superhero-like power of flight, participants displayed greater pro-social behaviour.
Interestingly, although the Proteus effect was designed to explain the effects of
using virtual avatars in computer games, there is evidence that any cognitive
processing that activates stereotypes about others can lead to stereotypes about the
other being transferred onto the self (DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005; Kawakami
et al., 2012; Wheeler, Demarree, & Petty, 2007).
The existence of the Proteus effect suggests that in some cases embodying an
avatar of a disadvantaged social group may have the counter-productive effect of
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activating stereotypes associated with that group rather than breaking them down.
For example, it has been shown that participants of either gender showed greater
mathematical problem solving when assigned to a male avatar competing against
female avatars than did those assigned a female avatar competing against male
avatars, suggesting that the Proteus effect worked to increase stereotypes about
gender differences in mathematics (Lee, Nass, & Bailenson, 2013). It has also been
found that assigning female participants to sexualised avatars increased their self-
objectification and made them more likely to blame victims of rape for their
situation (Fox, Ralston, Cooper, & Jones, 2014). Others studies have shown that
playing a Black character in a computer game leads participants to show more
aggressive cognition and affect, presumably as a result of the activation of
stereotypical views of Black men as violent (Ash, 2016; Eastin, Appiah, &
Cicchirllo, 2009). Importantly, Ash (2016) demonstrated that this effect was
mediated by the extent to which users felt embodied in their avatar, suggesting that
increased use of VR-based embodiment in gaming could lead to increased
reinforcement of stereotyped views.
Currently, there has been little research on the Proteus effect and prejudice in
fully embodied VR. However, two relevant studies have been conducted that
suggest that it may also affect full embodiment. Groom, Bailenson, and Nass (2009)
examined the effect of embodiment in a Black avatar during a job interview
scenario, a situation associated with racial discrimination (Dasgupta, 2004), and
found that participants subsequently showed increased rather than decreased racial
bias. In another study, Kilteni, Bergstrom, and Slater (2013) found that participants
embodying a black avatar exhibited higher variation and frequency of movement in
a drumming task than did those embodying a white avatar; a finding the authors
suggested was due to the stereotype of Black people as more rhythmic. Further
research on the question of how much these divergent effects of embodying an out-
group on prejudice towards that group should examine the role of context in such
manipulation. For example, researchers could have participants embody female or
black avatars that are placed in either stereotypical or counter-stereotypical settings
(e.g. a woman either cooking at home or working as a scientist in a laboratory) and
then investigate the relationship between type of avatar embodied, setting and
strength of embodiment on participant’s implicit associations towards the embodied
group.
These examples of how the Proteus effect can lead to the activation of
stereotypes during embodiment point to the importance of being sensitive to the
context in which the embodiment takes place, in order to ensure successful
reduction of prejudice. This point is of particular relevance considering that the
most widespread use of embodiment in the future is likely to be in the form of video
games. Several recent reviews have demonstrated that both women and non-White
ethnic groups are under-represented in video games, and when they are featured,
they tend to be depicted in highly stereotypical and negative ways (Burgess, Dill,
Stermer, Burgess, & Brown, 2011; Deskins, 2013; Dickerman, Christensen, & Kerl-
McClain, 2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that mere exposure to, as opposed to
identification with, depictions of women and non-White ethnicities in video games
can lead to negative attitudes towards those groups (Dill, Brown, & Collins, 2008;
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Dill & Burgess, 2012). Given the evidence that embodiment can lead to a stronger
activation of stereotypes than other forms of media (Ash, 2016; Groom et al., 2009),
it is important that the portrayal of women, Black, Asian and minority ethnic
(BAME) people and members of other disadvantaged social groups is treated as an
important issue by game designers. As VR technology advances to allow increased
malleability of the boundaries between self and other, it is vital that those involved
in designing the new forms of media and entertainment that make use of VR are
aware of the need to combat lazy and stereotypic depictions of other social groups,
and instead use these advances to present members of other group in a manner that
builds up empathy and reduces prejudice between groups.
Conclusion
This paper has explored how prejudice and negative attitudes towards different
groups can be altered by changing their closeness to the self. We have described an
important division between two forms of selfhood, the more basic ‘‘bodily self’’ and
the more abstract and socially constructed ‘‘conceptual self’’. We then examined the
role of the self in prejudice, showing that both the bodily and the conceptual self are
sensitive to group differences. The self can be involved in the construction of in-
group/out-group distinctions, and in the derogation of disliked social groups. In
addition, we highlighted the strong links between brain regions involved in self-
representation are also involved in the social cognitive processes that underlie
prejudice. We then moved on to presented evidence that the malleable nature of
self-representations, both at the conceptual and bodily levels, offers a powerful
method of changing social attitudes and reducing prejudice. Finally, we considered
how the increasing availability of VR, which allows for the experience of fully
embodying another person, presents opportunities and hazards for approaches that
aim to use the self to change social attitudes. In summary, we present evidence for
the importance of considering the role of the self in the development and
maintenance of prejudice as well as suggesting that the malleability of self-
representation opens up several important new directions and issues for those
interested in prejudice reduction.
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